THE STUDY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE (NATURAL GAS AND OIL) IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, CASE STUDY, THE KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ (2005-2016)

پرِسا دابەشكرنا سامانيَن نەفت وگازێ دسيستەمێن فيدرالى دا ,ئەزموونا هەرێما كوردستانێ دگەل حكومەتا عيراقێ دماوێ 2005 ـ 2016

Abstract

This study refers to the Kurdistan Region's experience with the Baghdad government during the period 2005 2016 on the issue of management of natural resources (oil, natural gas), especially in which he said the permanent Iraqi constitution of 2005, which pointed to this matter clearly in the light of the articles (111) and (112) despite the lack of clarity of oil and natural gas form of ownership. And the emphasis on all the existing fields without a reference to future fields, as well as the existence of strict legal controls imposed by the Constitution on the Kurdistan Region on the conclusion of oil contracts with foreign companies and the requirement for approval of Baghdad to those contracts. Also, this issue mingled with political factors, caused the emergence of political differences and instability and the outbreak of the ongoing wars and consolidating the culture of autocracy that has remained constant effects to this day, in spite of the emergence of a new Iraq after the year 2003 and the pace of steps towards democratization of the political system, and even the province of Kurdistan affected the system of government in which authoritarian nature as do oil-producing countries as a result of the lack of transparency in the contracting and export of oil. So the problem does not lie in the changed political situation as far as the need for a change in vision, mental and Treatment Authority to benefit from successful experiences of federalism in the world and the Middle East.

In the economic perspective, and in spite of long experience in the extraction and export of oil, Iraq has remained to the present day state of the renter and the owner of a unilateral economy side, and stayed oil source chairman for revenue and finance the state budget, and against which is to allocate a portion of the Kurdistan Region amounting to (17%) as well as the rule of the central mental in Baghdad and its failure to provide concessions to the Kurds for the purpose of their participation in the political decision-making and management of natural resources making, not to give the region autonomy of decision in this area a chance.